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ABSTRACT

Title of the dissertation:

Towards an improvement of the services and the
operations at the International Port
of Port-au-Prince

Degree:

MSc

Haiti’s political instability has greatly affected the country’s development. The
stagnation of ongoing development has done more bad than good. An misery for
everyone and a real dilemma for the society. the country has been unable to:

1- allocate or decrease the present degree of poverty
2- provide education and employment for the present generation of young
people
3-expand its inter-related maritime multi-use activities
4- undertake sustainable and viable development which will bring dividend to
the welfare of the Haitian people
5- obtained foreign currencies to wider the perspective of development .
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One can then understand that the International Port of Port-au-Prince does not
escape to this general situation of deterioration which affects the services offered to
customers. As Haiti is an Island which depends greatly on imports for its survival it is
understandable that it is of a big concern for the writer, as a Haitian citizen and a civil
servant, to attempt to bring her participation to the development of the country.

Belonging to this sector which is very important for Haiti, the writer will then
try to make some propositions of a policy which can respond to the need of the port

Firstly a look will review the current situation by going into the present
administration, the situation of the port that means its physical distribution , the
services offered and the way the operations are carried out in the port area.

Secondly an assessment on the APN and the performance of port operations
will be done. As a result this analysis should give rise to numerous deficiencies
experienced in the administration and the port area most of which related to
bureaucracy problems, overload of employees, lack of trained people , lack of return
on investment to make improvement by modernising the administration and the port.
The main problems which will be pointed out and their causes will be investigated in
the light of knowledge gained by the writer from her practical experience at the port .
Also field training exercises, and research and study at WMU will be more then
helpful for her in assessing the IPPAP.

To the matters which will be discovered , alternatives solution will be
contemplated and closely examined in turn. Eventually a combined solution between
commercialisation and a gradual involvement of the private sector will be taken out
as being, in the writer point of view, the more likely one, which could bring some
improvement to the port sector in the actual context prevailing in Haiti.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the last 20 years world shipping has undergone significant technological
and organisational changes. Unlike previous developments the implications of these
were not confined to the shipping industry but equally affected other modes of
transport and transfer points, i.e. ports and inland

terminals. Furthermore,

developments in shipping technology have been observed in all shipping markets,
even though at varying degrees.

As the evolution of more efficient transport systems has been originated in
trades between developed countries, it was also the ports of these countries that were
first affected. It was only with a time-lag of some 10 to 15 years that these changes
were also introduced in developing countries trades, based on the necessity to reduce
freight costs and meet the requirements of physical concepts applied by trading
interests in developed countries.

The question whether these new concepts such as containerisation and
multimodal transport are suitable ones for developing countries or not has given rise
to considerable controversy since their introduction. Serious doubts have been raised
at various occasions on the wisdom of introducing capital intensive transport systems
in countries generally characterised by a scarcity of capital and an abundance of
unskilled labour.

Ports in developing countries did accept the challenge of new transport
systems and reacted to them. While this reaction in many cases may not have been as
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appropriate and efficient as that developed countries’ ports, a certain differentiation is
required and specific constraints are to be taken into account.

In most of developing countries the reaction of ports to new transport and
trade requirements is still inadequate. This inadequacy is due to various factors, such
as the lack of finance for both infrastructure and equipment investments, the lack of
human capital as well as the often missing political insight into the requirements of a
port which may enable it to play its proper role in the total transport chain and thus in
the promotion of foreign trade and economic development of a country. Bearing this
in mind an account will be given of developments in the transport sector affecting the
International Port of Port-au-Prince (IPPAP) as well as of possibilities of this port not
only to react to such developments but also to play an active role in the design and
implementation of an efficient transport system.

The IPPAP should be able to provide for the movement of goods in and out of
Haiti,

since no nation can exist on a basis of self--sufficiency, there must be

interchange with other countries. Specific demand are made on the quality of
performance of this port from the point of view of the ship and its cargo. It must be
agreed that the attraction of a port is essentially dependant on its ability to conform as
closely as possible with the individual requirements of each and every customer.
Nowadays ships are not prepared to wait for the port and the availability of its
services , it is rather the port that must wait for ships. Cargo, on the other hand,
requires from port a comprehensive port performance among other features.

The port of Port-au-Prince is placed in a detrimental position. Actually, the
port has became less competitive over the last two decades, and the situation seems
to be worsened gradually at the profit of its competitors, namely the port of Rio
Haina (Dominican Republic) and the port of Kingston (Jamaica). This fact has
engendered disastrous consequences that are deeply felt throughout the socio-
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economic sectors. Obviously, the failure is due to several reasons, some of which are
imputable to internal factors (related to the port itself) while others are connected to
external factors (particularly socio-politico-economic environment).

The ambition of this paper is to look at the performance of the port of Portau-prince from a broad perspective of management in a developing country. This
approach has been chosen because observations by the writer have indicated that the
situation existing in the Authorite Portuaire Nationale (APN) is largely characteristic
of government owned port in developing countries as a whole. As this paper
progresses, attempts will be made to emphasise issues that seem to be congruent with
the central theme under investigation.

Level of performance no doubt is the corner stone which differentiates a good
port and a bad one. Among other things the elements responsible for a good level of
performance of a port are the equipment, the waiting time, the ship turn around time
and one can say above all that, the human resource capability.

Obviously all of those factors deserve special attention because they are
interconnected and very complex because in the case of equipment there are high
costs involved in purchasing, operating and maintaining it and also it is significant
when determining the level of efficiency and cost-effectiveness of terminal
operations. Then comes the necessity to introduce a proper equipment policy into the
APN. When it comes to consider the waiting time the number of berths available, the
number of tonnes per hour per crane and gangs are important elements to look into.
The human resource development of course through the organisation itself, the level
of knowledge of these employees regarding the port sector and the possibility of
training have to be taken into consideration. All of this usually determine the level of
performance and reliability of a port and its degree of calling at a port. As Professor
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Jean Michel Mancion has pointed out in his lectures of last year the faster the ship
turn around time the more this port will be call by ships..

In the light of all of this, the current situation will be analysed in a way that a
proper diagnosis can be drawn, and causes pointed out. Considering the ongoing
discussion on privatisation of ports prevailing in Haiti, various forms of port reforms
will be examined. An alternative solution will be designed which can fit to the APN.
Since no reform is easy and can be brought overnight, the option chosen will be
flexible.
Whatever the option adopted, only a proper policy for running the port can
guarantee the efficiency of the services offered by the port. and the costseffectiveness of the operations.
Lastly, this topic has been chosen by the writer in order to contribute to the
recovery of his port which is drifting too far. Of course this dissertation is not an
exhaustive work because it considers the overall without going into all the details
because of a lack of accurate data , if not at all. However , it will try to consider how
an improvement in the APN policy can bring some competitiveness to the port and
then bring back the customers lost prior to the 1986 and 1991 crisis.
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Chapter 2

Presentation of the current situation at the International Port of Port-au-Prince

2.1- Introduction

The imposition to import most of our goods which are in principle not
available locally force Haiti to have international ports. On the other hand it is the
mean of transportation by which the country exports its primary products like :
coffee, Cocoa, and some handicrafts products.

The international port of Port-au-Prince was built in 1911. At this time the
quay was 610 m long and prolonged by a pier of 183m with a breath of 14.5m which
constituted the base for handling the cargo.

The port of Port-au-Prince is indispensable to the development of the entire
economy of Haiti. It plays an essential role not only in providing Haiti with foreign
trade with other countries but also in upgrading the standards of living of the island
inhabitants.

2.2- The Port Management Organisation

The International Port of Port-au-Prince is under the auspices of the National
Port Authority which consists of an Administration Advisory Committee and a
General Port Management Company.
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-The Administration Advisory Committee consists of 5 members who are as
follows:
-The Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Haiti who acts as
Chairman.
-The Minister of Finance and Economy who acts as the Vice-Chairman.
-A Representative from the ministry of Industry and Commerce who acts as
member.
-A Representative from the Ministry of Transport, Communication, and
Public Works who is a member
- A Representative of Shipping agencies who acts also as member.

The Administration Advisory Committee has the mandate of providing port
services to foreign vessels, shipping agencies and other users of the International Port
of Port-au-Prince.

It can be easily understood that such an administration with so much parties
for decision making process is very slow when it is not totally inoperative.
Effectively there is no flexibility at all in the organisation of the writer.

The mandate comprises of the following objectives:
- to develop, maintain and operate all the infrastructures, in the port.
-to carry out feasibility studies, to analyse them and then perform projects
towards improving the efficiency of the port services.
- to have continuous a co-operation with other maritime organisations which
are state- owned and which are interested in the different activities of the port.
- to increase the effectiveness of the services which has a connection with the
infrastructures and the port operations.
- to provide both security and infrastructure facilities for the safety of the port
area.
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-to establish, revise and reinforce if needs be the operations and procedures of
the port services in order to captivate higher fund generation.
- to establish regulations which control the fees for port dues, the different
rights that consumers may be entitled to and rules that need to be observed while in
the port area.
-to draft the necessary contract including the terms and conditions for leasing
and renting of allocated places and other equipment belonging to the port
- to organise and supervise the coastal trade shipping around the territorial
waters including the EEZ
-to promote, develop and administer the free port area.
-to request, if need be, the technical, scientific and financial co-operation of
other relevant organisation.

The General Port Management Company consists of an Executive Committee
which scrutinises the operations documents and controls the ongoing activities in the
port; they also meet annually to discuss the budget, new investment and renovation of
port infrastructure.

The personnel of the port management company comprises of a Managing
Director who has the overall duties of the port management. Under his jurisdiction
there is a technical cabinet , a legal cabinet and a planning department. There are also
eight other departments which consist of an administrative department, a direction
for national trade and coastal vessel, a Department of Finance and a Department for
maintenance of equipment. These departments are supposed to have continual
communication and interlink in the execution of their duties.
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2.3-The Vessel Traffic Management

The International Regulation for Preventing Collision at Sea plus the
amendments of 1983 , 1989 has a special section which is classified as rule 10 where
they advocates a traffic separation scheme for vessel traffic management especially in
port areas. This regulation gives the country an excellent support to carry out
effectively cargo handling at quay at the International Port of Port-au-Prince because
it enables Haiti to avoid traffic congestion and collision between ships and also
enables the regulation of the movement of pleasure crafts and fishing vessels.

Whether The Government of Haiti has ratified the Collision Regulation
through the activities that are undertaken in the Port of Port-au-Prince call for
stringent control of all shipping movements in order to facilitate rapid discharge and
loading of cargo. If this is undertaken on effectively shipowners will find the
International Port of Port-au-Prince attractive for transhipment of cargoes or onward
forwarding of cargoes to ports where the ship draft does not permit them to sail.

2.4-Vessel Traffic Separation scheme

It is crystal-clear that there are always multi uses of a harbour area. as the law
of the commons does not apply to interdisciplinary users of the sea. Where there is a
port there will be an enormous amount of marine related activities.. It is not an
elementary and simple matter to organise a vessel traffic separation scheme unless all
the activities are monitored on a continuous basis. Looking at it vis a vis a financial
aspect it would be very costly to set traffic movement of cruisers, cargo ships,
pleasure craft, coastal vessels and fishing vessels. However, due to the International
Convention on Regulation of Collision it is the writer utmost opinion that shipping
movement has to be regulated in the International Port of Port-au-Prince.

8

As regard to the Vessel Traffic Service (VTS), a simple communication
system is provided. A radio station using VHF-FM on channels 12, 14, 16 and
additional ones and medium frequency AM works round the clock. Standard time in
the country is that of the meridian of 75 degree West or 5 hours behind of Greenwich
Mean Time.

In order to facilitate rapid movement, special authorisations can be granted to
ships’ masters who are used to the port to berth their ships or shift them from one
berth to another without pilot.

The international Port of Port-au-Prince does not own quay be for serving
military ships which own their own quay totally separate from the port of Port-auPrince.

2.4.4-Fishing vessels.

There are no fishing vessels at the present moment vessels moving around the
port of Port-au-Prince. However, there is the possibility that in the future berthing for
commercial fishing vessels may be catered.

2.5-Background Information related to the services offered by the Port of Portau-Prince

2.5.1-Nautical Access features

The International Port of Port-au-Prince is very well protected and almost
always calm. It is situated at the extreme Southeast of Port-au-Prince, 18 degree 33
minutes North and 72 degree 21minutes West. The tidal variations fluctuate between
0,39 and 0,48. The currents in the port are negligible. The Port offers a large basin of
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anchorage composed of sand and coral with a depth lying between 16 and 28m.
Access to the port is by either of two channels of 5 leagues wide: the Canal de SaintMarc and the Canal du Sud ou de la Gonave. each of those channels are 4 km long
and 12 to 20 meters depth.

Generally the meteorological conditions are good as the bay is always calm.
The rainy season is from March to June and September to December. It is to be noted
that there are only 2 seasons in Haiti. The currents are very weak inside the Port-auPrince Bay.

Table 1-Geographical position of anchorage buoys
Buoy A 18-33’-13.1”N

72-22’-43.1” W

Buoy B 18-33’-19”N

72-23’-07.7” W

Buoy C..18-33’-24.6”N

72-23’-31.5” W

Buoy D 18-33’-52.4”N

72-22’-57” W

Buoy F 18-34’-04.1”N

72-23’-45” W

Buoy H 18-34’-09.5”N

72-24’-09.2” W

Buoy J 18-34-’27” N

72-23-’23”

W

Buoy K 18-34-’44” N

72-23-’57”

W

Buoy L 18-34’-42” N

72-22’-45”

W

Buoy Q 18-34’-16.4”N

72-22’-55”

W

2.5.2-Pilotage features

The pilotage facilities belong to the National Port Authority which can decide
regarding disciplinary and control matters related to the behaviour of pilots. The
National Port Authority ensures also the respect of standards concerning the pilotage
itself. In addition it provides all the equipment necessary and impose the tariffs of
pilotage.
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It is compulsory for all ships from 800 TJB calling the Port of Port-au-Prince
to use the pilotage facilities offer by the port at the arrival and when leaving the port
The ships must inform the port about their estimating time of arrival through VHF
channel 16 and 12 .

2.5.3--Towage features

The towage facilities

are provided by private companies linked to the

National Port Authority by mean of contract. Two tugs of 800 and 1100 hp service
the port. Team of workers belonging to the National Port Authority provide without
interruption their services to anchored ship, ships leaving the port or for any other
move in the area of the port.

It is to be noticed that The facilities for towage and lamanage are far from
being sufficient when we see the number and different types of ships calling the port
as well as the tonnage of some of them, the number and the power of these tugs
cannot respond to the demand.
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Table 2-Type of ships calling the IPPAP : 1987-1998

Period

RoRo

LoLo

Mix

Roulier

Cargo

Tankers

Other

Total

87-88

180

118

126

46

77

49

110

710

88-89

211

72

137

57

65

58

105

705

89-90

147

109

123

41

62

63

100

645

90-91

190

79

140

36

86

59

91

681

91-92

68

38

63

9

69

24

69

335

92-93

81

25

222

6

192

26

94

646

93-94

55

8

81

2

58

26

230

300

94-95

239

82

232

29

112

32

204

930

95-96

76

110

329

20

159

34

184

912

96-97

27

100

299

23

168

15

163

821

97-98

39

65

319

27

166

20

192

824

Source:Registres Administratifs APN

2.5.4-Berth features

The jetty of the IPPAP has a length of 758 m on both sides. One of the 2 rollon/roll-off platforms is available on the north side of the jetty. While the other is
between 8 to 10 meters deep and the wharf can berth 7 ships with an average length
of 120 meters.

The port disposes of berthing facilities approximately 4 km from the boarding
zone. The relatively new facilities comprise of the following:

-three general cargo berths
-two container berths
-two Ro-Ro berths
-two multi purpose berths
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The throughput of the berths handling general cargo is shown in the next
table:

Total throughput for the periods 96-97 and 97-98 in Metric tonnes

Berths

Number of ships

Total traffic

1997

1998

1997

1998

1-General cargo (3)

50

65

30512

40000

2-Ro-Ro (2)

28

35

15800

22000

3-Multi-purpose (2)

300

319

50200

55303

Total

378

419

96512

117303

Value in Metric Tonnes

60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0

1-General cargo (3)
2-Ro-Ro (2)
3-Multi-purpose (2)

1997

1998

Source: APN Statistics.

Figure1 Evolution of the troughput in metric tonnes 1996 to 1998.

Throughput of the container berths for the period 96-97and 97-98 in TEU
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Berths

Nber of containers

Total traffic TEU

2

96-97

97-98

96-97

97-98

Total

52207

81750

110725

119873

Source: APN statistics

It is to be noticed that the performance of the general cargo berths is of 45
tonnes per ship per hour and of 14 movements per hour for handling a container
vessel.
2.5.5-Handling features

The equipment available for handling containers, general cargo is between 15-20
years old. According to information updated in February 1998, the equipment may be
broken down as follows:

Table 3-Handling equipment
units

working

breakdown

out of order

Cranes

3

1

1

1

Cont.FLT

4

2

1

1

G.Cargo FLT

23

1

10

12

Shunting Trailer

15

8

5

2

Flatbed Trailers

11

11

0

0

Total

56

23

17

16

Source APN(DEEM)

Table 4-Composition of the handling equipment by categories
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Description

Capacity

Year of purchase

1 Mobile Crane

150t

1977(out of use)

1 Rail-Mounted Crane

30t

1978

1 Struddle Carrier

33.6t

1981

Table 5-Container Forklift Trucks
Description

Capacity

Year of purchase

1FLT

24t

1977

2FLT

36,6t

1978 (out of use)

1 FLT’s

35t

1986

Table 6-General Cargo FLT
Description

Capacity

Year of purchase

16 FLT’s

3.5t

1977

5 FLT’s

7t

1978

2 FLT’s

9t

1980

Table 7-Shunting Trailers & Flatbeds Trailers
Description

Year of purchase

15 Shunting Trailers

Range 1980-90

11 Flatbeds Trailers

Range 1975

Source: APN(DEEM)
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The equipment inventory shows that it is far from adequate because obsolete
and can not respond successfully to the actual demand. A major reason for that is
there is no equipment planning. As the lecturers Ircha and Crook have pointed out in
their lectures of May 1999, it is vital to ensure that the port always has a level of
equipment which can satisfy the operational requirements.

2.5.6-Storage Features

Storage facilities are a matter of concern for port managers especially when
ports do not have enough land to expand their storage facilities. At the Port of Portau-Prince the storage area occupies an area of 180,000m2 shared as follow:

Table 8-Storage facilities
Description

Surface

2 transit sheds

17,920m2

5 halls for general cargo

9,675m2

Container yard

84,972m2

Open air storage

10,060m2

Covered storage

18,110m2

source: APN (Annuaire 1997)

2.6-Conclusion
The review of the current situation at the IPPAP talks for itself. The
organisation is a centralised one which does not permit the right decision to be taken
in that sense that decisions concerning the important things that make a port efficient
have to be approved by all the members of the board of direction. In Haiti political
influences and centralised matters are the worse enemies of the public entities.
Political adherence and acquaintance rather than competence are the main
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requirements for managers to be appointed. The result is that such managers become
powerless. These circumstances have caused the problems to persist or even to be
worsened over time. Also the frequent change of mangers has been to the detriment
of the port because the tendency is that every new management staff tempts to
implement their own policy .

It appears then that a big change in the mentality is the first requirement for
Haitian Organisations to be able to respond to their duty. People should know that a
port organisation has a commercial aspect which is predominant and consequently
has to be managed in a way which can bring money mostly hard currencies which in
the case of Haiti is very important for the equilibrium of the balance of payments
because of its high amount of debts contracted vis-a-vis the Word Bank, International
Monetary Funds etc.
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Chapter 3

3-Assessment of the International Port of Port-au-Prince

3.1.- The National Port Authority

The first port installations at Port-au-Prince

were built in 1911. They

comprised of a quay wall of 610m long with a jetty of 183m long and was 14,5m
width . At this time a Haitian-American private company had made a lease for 50
years to manage the company. This ended in 1956 when the Port Administration of
Port-au-Prince was created and placed under the supervision of the National Bank of
the Republic of Haiti (BNRH).

By different decrees the status of the institution was modified gradually and
on June 18, 1973 became an autonomous organisation . The Port Administration’s
role consisted of managing the International Port of Port-au-Prince and other ports in
the country. Five years later, in 1978, a new appellation was given to the
organisation: The Authorite Portuaire Nationale. On March15, 1985 a new decree
gave the APN the mandate to run the Port of Port-au-Prince.

Actually the National Port Authority (NPA) has under its jurisdiction two
international ports ,: the International Port of Port-au-prince , the International Port of
Cap-Haitien, and 16 other coastal navigation ports.
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As already indicated the National Port Authority is

a state-owned

organisation with commercial purposes. Its main aim is to provide all kinds of port
services to ships, shipowners, shipbrokers and all other port’s users.

The APN is endowed with an Administrative Advisory Committee of 5
members elected by the Central Government and a General Port management leads
by a general manager who is elected also by the Government. The fact that APN
meets all the requirements of a state owned company shows that the public sector
plays a dominant role in the guidance and overall

development of APN. It is

typically controlled by a small elite who have an enormous influence against others
decisions of the management port company leading

to many problems in the

management of the administration and the port’s operations.

One problem in the management’s organisation of APN is at the level of
decision making for decision to be taken leads to lengthy discussions which most of
the time are to the detriment of APN. Considering that the National Port Authority is
theoretically a

commercial organisation which has developmental objectives to

meet,. and also that realising these objectives depends on its ownership and its degree
of legal and financial autonomy, one can conclude that the port authority cannot
respond to its duties effectively.

3.1.2- Managerial assessment

At the managerial level the problem is that the general management is elected
by the government and then depends entirely on the administrative advisory
Committee for ratifying its all decisions that the port has to take for playing its role in
the society like:
-generation of employment
-better distribution of the port wealth
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-better economic and social cohesion into the region
-promotion of export
-and protection of the marine environment

Any organisation private or public is linked to the development of other
sectors in the economy. These links may be seen through an input output analysis.
Usually the stronger the links are the better the organisation succeed in designing
effective public policy.

3.1.3- Promotion of exports
One of the most important roles of ports is to promote exports. Developing
countries are dependent on industrialised nations in terms of:
-International trade, foreign investment and the activities of multi-national
enterprises;
-International monetary arrangements, foreign aid and related activities;
-International consulting organisations
-Research and development activities associated with all above,

One of the means of coping with this dependency of developing country as
Haiti is to promote exports which can bring foreign currencies. This is very important
in terms of repayment of international loans and balancing the national debt. In this
context it can be seen that the National Port Authority has a big role in promoting
exports.

During the colonisation period Haiti was called ST-DOMINGUE and was
one of the richest in all the colonies. and the greater part of its wealth came from her
exports. This exports consisted of mainly sugar, coffee, cotton, indigo and precious
wood. Since independence exports have dropped considerably. Now the Haitian
exports account for only 10% of her GNP. For example in 1998, according to the
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National bank of Haiti (BRH), Haitian exports were 180 million US dollars while its
import reached 245 million of US dollars which meant that balance of trade
registered a loss of 65 million US dollars.

One of the reasons for the dramatic drop in exports is the low price of sugar
and coffee on the international market. Other than agricultural produce the Haitian
Government should also promote the products assembled in Haiti by offering
through the port of Port-au-Prince incentives in lowering prices at export.
Unfortunately any of these measures have been taken. Consequently there is a
significant decrease in foreign earnings decrease in total tonnage handled. The table
following shows the big gap between import and export from and to different
countries for the period September 1997 -October 1998:

Table 9-Tonnage of merchandise handled from and to the 5 continents for the
period September 1997-October 98 from the Port of Port-au-Prince

Continents

Discharged

Loaded

Difference

Europe

89,126

7,440

81,685

Asia

94,870

71

94,798

Africa

-

-

-

America

1,640,265

46,902

1,593,363

Oceania

1,635

-

1,635

Total

1,825,897

54,415

1,769,846

From the foregoing figure, we can see that there is a big gap between the
tonnage of merchandise handled at import and export. That means that the country is
loosing money because the percentage of exports is very low and almost nothing is
earned by the port as far as exports are concerned.. Of course this problem is not only
dependent on the policy of the National Port Authority which can not fix tariff
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regarding its own view. In fact the Board of Direction has the final word, but also
because the government has a totally different way of seeing the problem. For
instance, the government is unable to promote intensive cultivation of coffee and
cacao because the few plantation’s owners want to have the monopoly in order to
keep their prices high.

In this context, the APN has no latitude because not only the percentage of
exports are low but also the administration has no power on fixing prices although it
is said a commercial organisation.

3.1.4-Human resources assessment

The increase of urban population has taken place in some developing
countries such as Haiti largely because of the fast growing population movements
from rural to urban areas, and over concentration of new employment opportunities
in the cities.
The urban growth phenomena has created lethal combinations of
interrelated and self-generating problems of enormous proportions., Problems of
urban transport associated with the growth in vehicles are one integral component of
the wider urban development situation of cities in developing countries.

The backcloth to these circumstances in most of these countries consists of:
- widespread unemployment
- a lack of skilled manpower especially at managerial levels
- occasional high rates of inflation (29,3 per cent per annum average for middleincome economies, compared with 8 per cent per annum for industrialised countries)
- high birth and death rates
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- relatively low life expectancy (between 59 and 61 years) for low-income and
middle-income, respectively, compared with an equivalent figure of 76 years for the
industrialised countries
- high illiteracy levels, with an average 30 percent of the population’s relevant age
group attending school and 4 per cent attending further education in the low-income
nations, as against comparable figures of 87 and 37 per cent in industrialised
countries.( Dimitriou, 1990, p14).

It is understandable that the issue of employment is very important in Haiti.
In the National Port Authority the issue of recruiting personnel is very complex one
because in one hand the managing board has possibility to recruit personnel, while on
the other hand the government can impose anyone to the Board of Administration
and when we know that there is a big problem of unemployment in Haiti one can
imagine the profile of a great number of employees of the National Port Authority.
Usually this recruitment is by presenting resume, it is very common to see people
without any educational background being employed prior to qualified persons.

The problem of qualified persons is a very big matter for this country which
does not own a maritime school. It is not a secret that Haiti lacks expertise, especially
in the port sector. It is not an easy task to find managers who can combine at the
same time competence in the maritime field and other necessary qualities. It is a
necessity not only for managers, but also for all those who are involved in port
operations, to have knowledge in the field and a good idea of the changes taking
place in shipping. Looking at the personnel, a different reality was noticed.
According to the figures updated in September 1998, the port had 1688 employees
and staff which is thought to be excessive, formerly there used to be a workforce of
not more than 500 people .
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Comparing the above to the ports of Malmö and Copenhagen, that are bigger
in all respects, there were respectively in 1999, 300 and 600 employees and staff. Of
the 1,688 people, 1,200 employees, that is 70 % had no qualifications for the work in
the organisation nor did they have any specific tasks to perform. Hence, this excess in
employees constitutes a heavy financial burden in salaries and more so if they do not
have specific duties to perform.

Of the remaining 488 employees which represents 30%, only 2.6 per cent had
been trained in a maritime field. Since there is no training school in the country as it
has been pointed out earlier, they have been trained abroad, especially in the “Institut
Portuaire et de Recherche (IPER) du Havre in France. and one, a former WMU
graduate, Sir Julio Julien was appointed as the general manager of the National Port
Authority in May 1997. It is to be noted that from 1983 to 1998, 7 people have
graduated from World Maritime University. However, 4 of them have left the
country , because of precariousness of employment and few incentives given to them,
and at the present moment 3 are still working for the National Port Authority. In
1997, a survey conducted on a sample of 61 middle managers and deputies showed
the following result. ( Lazare, 1997, p28)

Table 10-Survey on Middle Managers’ training in 1997

People

High school

Higher education

Maritime training

12

12

12

12

30

30

30

-

19

19

-

-

Source: Murat Dissertation MSc 1997, WMU

From these figures it can be seen that only 12 people have taken part in
courses or seminars related to port activities. The inadequacy of a human resource
policy is seen in the recruitment process, promotion and retirement. Practically as
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already indicated politics dictate the choice of employers and employees, which are
not always in line with the port needs. There is no big effort to retrieve the rare
competencies available. The worst cases involve often political power, pressure
groups which inundate the port with people without any qualifications at all.
Very often managers are completely disarmed and just accept the fact.

The same can be said about the promotion practices which usually do not
reflect

good policy which adds to the frustation of the management. A direct

consequence to this is absenteism which is not easy to remedy. As regards to salaries,
the treatment is not better. The salary structure is always spoken of, but not
standardised so that there was a disparity among employees of the same level. This
has given rise to criticism by a number of employees. The tables following
will give an overview of the distribution of the employees for a period of 10 years
from 1988 to 19998, and by responsibility for the period October 1997-September
1998.
Evolution of the Personnel
Sept Sept

Sept

Sept

Sept

Sept

Sept

Sept

Sept

Sept

Sept
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89
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Figure 2 Evolution of the personnel regarding the traffic
Table 11-Distribution of the employees by responsibility period
October1997 September 1998

97-98

Oct

No

De

Ja

Fe

Ma

Ap

Ma

Ju

Ju

Au

Se

Directions gen

33

35

36

37

37

37

43

43

43

43

43

40

Admi

198

195

195

194

195

195

195

197

202

202

201

200

Tech

149

149

149

149

148

148

148

152

152

153

151

150

Secu

228

227

226

225

225

223

221

221

221

221

215

217

Cabo

262

267

265

276

284

284

285

286

288

287

286

290

Exploi

470

478

480

480

481

482

482

485

489

488

486

489

DEEM

122

120

120

100

119

119

118

119

119

118

118

119

Finan

121

122

122

123

124

122

122

122

122

122

121

119

Dir & Ass

50

50

50

50

50

50

50

50

51

51

52

52

Control

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

Total

1645

1655

1655

1644

1675

1672

1670

1687

1699

1697

1685

1688

Control

2000

Dir & Ass
1500

Finan
DEEM

1000

Exploi
Cabo

500

Secu
0

Tech
Oct No

De

Ja

Fe

Ma Ap Ma

Ju

Ju

Au

1997 - 1998

Source:

Se

Admi
Directions gen

APN registres administratifs

Figure 3. Distribution of employees by responsibility.
From the above table, it is clear why the salary heading is diminishing much
of the revenue of the National Port Authority. Later in this paper it will be seen that
the number of ships calling the port generating the throughput passing by do not
justify at all this overload of employees working at the port.
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Table 12-Evolution of salaries from 1990 to 1998 in Haitian Gourdes
( 1 US dollar = 17 Haitian Gourdes)
90

92

94

96

98

Employees

1,492,316

1,176,835

1,294,742

3,157,169

5,978,884

Dockers

1,509,621

1,718,888

1,886,623

22,324,836

10,584,092

Overtime

1,294,394

155,985

157448

19,549,254

9,559,262

Overtime dockers

762,893

281,695

443,768

5,986,932

10,956,263

Total

5,059,224

3,333,403

3,782,581

51,018,191

37,078,501

employees

60,000,000
50,000,000
40,000,000
Total Salaries in
30,000,000
Gdes
20,000,000

Overtime dockers
Overtime employees
Dockers
Employees

10,000,000
0
90

92

94

96

98

Source: APN Financial report

Figure 4. Evolution of salaries employees versus dockers.

3.2-

Assessment of the performance of the port

Port performance indicators is a necessary tool for port management, for the
continuous evaluation of future capacity requirements and for an optimal allocation
of the existing resources in daily operation.

A single and effective measure of port productivity which can be used for
global comparison is more or less impossible to calculate (complexity of numerous
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cargo handling operations, the highly variable resource input and the degree of
technology.

Therefore a set of port performance indicators must be developed which
enables port management to monitor operational efficiency. Such indicators would
measure the annual berth throughput in tons handled per metre of quay; tons handled
per gang- hour; tons handled per gang/shift which is the quality of services to cargo
moving across a berth at a given time; and berth occupancy as a measure of the
proportion of time a berth is occupied per year. The latest is usually influenced by the
speed of ship - shore operations, design of ships and equipment aboard for
discharging, and comprehensive cargo information, well in advance.

The performance indicators can be separated into two main groups, on the
one hand the physical performance indicators and on the other hand the financial
indicators.

3.2.1-Berth occupancy
The term “ berth occupancy” covers the period of time during which a vessel
actually occupies a berth from actual arrival at the berth to actual departure. It is a
very important indicator as it describes the utilisation of the berth capacity and
therefore influences decision making for investments in new berths, which can be
considered as the highest financial burden for a port in general. To calculate the berth
occupancy ratio the number of hours of occupancy have to be multiplied per 100 and
the result divided by 24 hours times the number of berths. As an example, if a port
has been occupied during 200 hours and the number of berths available is 12 ,then
the occupancy ratio will be:
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200 *100/24*12 = 69% berth occupancy/day

In 1997 and 1998, the berth occupancy ratio at the National Port Authority
was 81 % and 91 % respectively. It has been calculated from the service time which
comprises a non-operational time and an operational time. The operational time is
limited by the availability of equipment at the International Port of Port-au-Prince.
This availability of equipment and its utilisation appear to be the major factors
determining congestion at this port.

Too often port operations equipment is not available when needed or is
subject to frequent breakdown during operations. This scarcity of equipment
provokes and maintains intolerable ship delay and high berth occupancy. For instance
when two or more container ships arrive at berth within a short period of time, only
one will be served by the only crane which exists , while the next waits until this unit
is available after completing the cargo discharge operation. (It is to be noticed that
this crane is 30 years old.). Ship operations may take more or less time depending on
the carrier. Often crane operators, stevedores gangs and drivers are required to work
overtime in order to reduce ship turn around time.

Usually the International Port of Port-au-Prince works two shifts. If the work
is carried at full time capacity the intrinsic capacity of the port could be better.

The difference between the intrinsic capacity and the actual performance in
the berth occupancy represents the slack caused by both avoidable and unavoidable
delays which might be summed up as:

-late attendance of pilots or any breakage of the vessel;
-late arrival of the vessel
-shortage of labour
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-lack of equipment
-late start of work
-bad timekeepers
-weather conditions
-unbalanced arrivals of vessels provoking queuing or few vessels to occupy
vacant berths
these unforeseen circumstances do not allow for a stable berth occupancy indicator.

3.2.2- The berth throughput

The essential function of a port is to facilitate two-way cargo flows between
land transport systems and sea transport systems. This function is appraised by
measuring port throughput which reflects the combined effect of the various factors
influencing port operations.
The proper analysis of the throughput depends upon the data available. Total
throughput is obtained by considering the throughput for each berth during
established periods.

The berth throughput in the International Port of Port-au-Prince is difficult to
be estimated because of the unreliability of available data. Berthing at the Port of
Port-au-Prince is carried out prior to containerships. A special case in allocating a
vessel to a berth rather than another one is when the allocated vessel has to shift to
complete her discharging and loading operations because her draft become smaller,
to leave vacant the former berth for ships with deeper draft. Besides that, the fact that
there is only one crane of 30- years- old available in the port does not ease also the
estimation and geared ships have not the same discharging and loading rate than
when they are operated with quay cranes.
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The tonnage handled in the International Port of Port-au-Prince are as follows
for the last 10 years.

Figure 5.Total throughput containerised cargo 1988 to 1998.
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Table 13. Tonnage handled in the International Port of Port-au-Prince during
the past 10 years containerised and general cargo

Year

Import

Export

Total

87-88

184343

56086

240429

88-89

233305

52239

285544

89-90

200845

48437

249282

90-91

190868

50129

240997

91-92

100964

18626

119590

92-93

171172

29408

200580

93-94

167473

12674

180147

94-95

270407

28363

298770

95-96

394187

32248

426435

96-97

346667

34993

381660

97-98

407145

38038

445183

source:Statistics(APN)
Figure 6. Total throughput general cargo 1988 to 1998.
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Table 14- Total throughput general cargo 1988 to 1998

Year

Import

Export

Total

87-88

115898

288

116186

88-89

209127

123

209250

89-90

269642

384

270026

90-91

222002

21

222003

91-92

166448

4

166452

92-93

307915

306

308221

93-94

186517

186517

94-95

310347

310347

95-96

403069

310

403379

96-97

463081

654

463735

97-98

484303

10859

495162

Source:Statistics(APN)

Table 15-Total traffic for the past 10 years and average growth in number of
ships calling and in the total throughput
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Years

Nber of ships

total throughput

average ships

average throughput

increase or decrease

increase or decrease

87-88

710

958,317

88-89

705

1,096,040

0.7%

14.37%

89-90

645

995,828

-8.5%

-9.14%

90-91

681

987,225

5.58%

-0.9%

91-92

335

583,273

-51%

-41%

92-93

646

897,126

92.8%

54%

93-94

300

511,932

-54%

-43%

94-95

930

1,285,133

210%

151%

95-96

912

1,679,838

-1.9%

30.7%

96-97

821

1,766,713

-10%

5.17%

97-98

824

1,874,795

0.3%

6%

Figure 7. Average growth in number of ships calling the port 1988 to 1998.
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Source:Statistics(APN)

From the tables shown above it can be seen that the total throughput for
general cargo is bigger than the total throughput for containerised cargo. This can be
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explained by the fact that the National Port Authority of Haiti owns only 1 gantry
crane which can only handle 15 tons per hour. From a recent survey leaded by the
statistics department of APN, it has been recognised that this crane does not operate
everyday. These tables also show that the total traffic generated at the Port of Portau-Prince and the number of ships calling the port follow a very fluctuated shape.
This is due to the fact that the country has been the theatre of a lot of military push
since 1986. The number of ships calling the port have also diminished due to a great
extend that any improvement in the facilities offered by the International Port of Portau-Prince has carried out. The Port of Port-au-Prince is a state-owned company and
as such the benefits generated by its activities instead of being employed to offer
modern services to ships, are claimed by the government to strengthen its political
position.

3.3-The ship turn-around time

The ship’s turn-around time in a port is the most important factor as it
influences the shipowner or ship operator choice to call at one port or not. As the
operational costs of a ship per day is very high, and is thus under time pressure, her
turn-around time in any port must be taken into consideration to help owners or
operators to cover their operational costs. A ship’s turn-around time at port is
carefully looked into by the shipping lines and their representatives in order to
calculate a port’s efficiency and the sailing schedules for their vessels.

A ship turn-around time is directly related to berth occupancy and berth
throughput and includes the following components:
-the actual time of operation
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-the waiting time of a ship in the port, this would cover. periods of nonoperation due to equipment breakdown, non-availability of cargo and /or labour,
shift-breaks, opening/closing of hatches, storms, rain etc.

-Manoeuvring and clearance-time prior to and after operation, such as
towage, mooring , customs clearance, immigration etc. are also contributing factors.

Table 16.An example of ship’s time at the IPPAP and an average volume of
cargo loaded and discharged during this time in tonnes
Type of ships

Average nber of days

Nber of ships

Average weight of cargo
loaded and discharged

Cargo ships

15

7

1500

Container

5

3

2000

Ro-Ro

8

5,502

1500

Source: APN harbour master

3.3.1- The waiting time

The waiting time of ships at the International Port of Port-au-Prince because
usually ships wait usually long before being allocated a berth. To demonstrate the
relation between the arrival time and the waiting time a sample of 120 days on a basis
of 10 consecutive days per month has been chosen. A survey was made of a total of
296 and 280 vessels of all types. They were counted respectively for each year for
the number of the above mentioned days. The two tables thereafter show the results
as follows.:
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Table 17-Average Waiting time in 1998
Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Au

Sep

Oct

Nov

Ship

25

21

19

26

29

29

32

19

23

18

24

DI

9.3

9.6

13.0

8.8

8.0

7.2

10

9.3

13.0

8.6

8.3

Average Wq*

Average Ts*

Total time

Waiting ratio

19 hours

91 hours

110 hours

20%

Source: Lazare MSc Dissertation 97, WMU
DI= daily intervals
Ts= service time

To summarise the above table, for the year 1998, the daily average 10.2 hours
roughly meaning that each 10 hours a ship called at the port. Then for a day of 24
hours, only 2.35 ships called.

Usually one of the main causes of such a long waiting time at port is that
changes taking place in shipping industry have a direct impact on ports which are
forced to respond quickly to those changes if they want to remain competitive. The
port of Port-au-Prince for not taking seriously this reality into consideration, has
failed to fulfil it responsibilities. As professor Mancion has pointed out (November
1998, lecture), ports are responsible for the waiting time related to traffic congestion,
non availability of berth and obsolete regulations.

From the table above showing the average waiting time in 1998, it can be
seen that congestion accounts for a small part in the total waiting time remembering
that only 2.35 ship called the port in a day in 1998. It is more an artificial congestion
created by inadequate facilities coupled with mismanagement of the existing ones.
The pattern of ship arrivals and arrivals distribution witnesses this fact. The same
could be said as well for the berth allocation. Regarding obsolete regulations., the
port is quite affected in terms of waiting. In a broader perspective, It is more
appropriate to speak about institutional problems instead. They are concerned mainly
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with the port not having enough autonomy, not setting up objectives and priorities
and this is in turn results to poor planning and an inappropriate equipment policy.

3.3.2- The ship operations

This sequence deals with the movement of cargo between the quay side and
the vessel. It comprises the preparation of cargo for the lift, the derrick or the crane
operations, and the release and disposal of the cargo after the lift.

At the IPPAP, before the ship is berthed the necessary gangs and the
operation methods are determined according to the services to be provided by the
ship-side gangs and the quay-side gangs of the respective sheds. These decisions
result from the operations manager onboard the ship and the operations manager on
the quay. The necessary cargo transfer equipment as well as the allocated manpower
(for the ship’s gear drivers, stevedores onboard and on the quay, the transfer
equipment drivers) are also determined.

On the ship the crew onboard as soon as the berthing takes place prepare her
by putting everything ready for the loading and discharging operations. The time
spent for preparation depends on the rapidity of both the stevedores ( if they have to
intervene in the preparation of the ship, e.g. unlashing deck cargo) and the crew
onboard.

3.3.3- The quay transfer operations

Identified to the moving of indirect routed cargo between the quay apron and
storage areas, this operation involves a wide range of equipment that is in turn
subject to continually varying demand. Although ship operations are carried out at a
low pace because of the aforesaid reasons, the transfer operation faces some
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difficulties in keeping in step with them. Many reasons may explain the delays and
interruptions observed within the transfer activities leading to starvation and
congestion on the quashed. However, regular visits during operation periods and
surveys conducted within the operation department have allowed for claiming that in
the search of a solution, priority must be given to the supply of equipment. In fact too
many men are allocated, as a consequence of low availability of equipment in order
to try to solve this problem. As a result the output of the transfer operation evidences
a low figure while the limited height of cargo stacking reduces considerably the
storage capacity, adding on delay and interruptions when storage area becomes
congested..

This is why, this expected low productivity brings about the need for change
if the port is to survive. Moreover, this situation not only reduces productivity of the
port, but also increases ship’s time at berth (increasing substantially maritime costs)
and directly puts up the cost per ton of cargo handled.

3.3.3- Structure of cargo handling costs

The International Port of Port-au-Prince has the reputation to be the more
expensive in the area. Excessive costs are a direct consequence of a poor
management, lack of communication between the different port entity concerned and
a poor equipment programme. It is the duty of the port Authority to minimise the
operating costs incurred by all concerned, the port, the vessels and the cargo interests.
Its basic aim is to make the best possible use of existing facilities. Providing better
operating conditions reveals a well known method of achieving goals as such as
increasing capacity of existing facilities and low costs. At the same time the port
management has to be improved. Conversely low productivity resulting from supply
matters described earlier causes handling costs to increase overtime and other
induced costs. Furthermore, time is a major factor with respect to costs of a vessel’s
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staying at the port. For vessels, each extra day spent in the port due to waiting or to a
slow dispatch means a loss of thousands of dollars on fixed expenses only.

In cargo handling, additional time induced by failure of equipment results in
higher labour costs and low turnaround of cargo on berth. As discussed above, the
way that transfer operations are conducted clearly signifies that the demand for
handling equipment exceeds the supply because of shortage in overall units as well as
an excessive percentage of units out of order awaiting repairs or spares parts.
Performed in conditions where low productivity is the norm, these operations address
high costs to be covered by the cargo being handled. In fact, the costs of operating
equipment consist of fixed and variable costs. Fixed cost are those incurred whether
the machines are used or not, and made up by the annual investment costs, preventive
maintenance and operators’ wages as the latter are permanently employed. On the
other hand, variable costs are mainly energy costs damage and repair costs.

Whatsoever the cost of ship awaiting is normally passed on as higher freight
rates for trade using the port. A congestion surcharge is usually imposed in the case
of liner shipping while the charter party makes provision for demurrage. In either
case, the extra charges incurred by the carrier will be passed on as higher freight rates
causing a rise in import and export prices of all cargoes passing through the port.

As said earlier the International Port of Port-au-Prince is particularly a good
illustration of a port said to be very expensive. Port tariffs are fixed as the following
US $310 per TEU for discharge and US$125 per TEU for loading containers,
whereas general cargo is handled at an average charge of US$6 per ton. One can
easily notice that port tariff levels act against containerisation and thereby cargo
traffic. This remark can be confirmed by assuming an average of 15 tonnes of general
cargo per TEU. Accordingly, cost would become approximately US$ 90 per TEU. As
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such, these tariffs necessitate a revision so as to be in line with the general trend
towards containerisation.
It is generally seen nowadays that port should operate as any private
enterprise and therefore be financially viable by itself. Profit then is necessary so that
the port must set as objective the minimisation of costs.

3.4- Conclusion
Considering the services offered by the APN as well as the operations of
loading, discharging and storing of cargo it can be understood that the performance is
very poor :
-too long waiting time
-lack and obsolete handling equipment
-excessive turnaround time regarding the number of ship calling a day
-excessive bureaucracy
This leads to the conclusion that definitely the port needs a drastic change. It
is where that port’s reforms should be scrutinised seriously. There are many ways to
conduct reforms in any kind of state-owned companies including companies
belonging to the port sector. The writer will attempt to review the different types of
reforms which could be applied to the IPPAP and suggest an alternative which can fit
her port.
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Chapter 4

4.1-Different alternatives for reforms in port sector

4.1.1-Reasons for reforms

4.1.1.1-The global environment

During the Last decade, there has been a world-wide trend of institutional
restructuring of the public sector. In some developed and developing countries, it has
taken the form of commercialisation or privatisation of public enterprises.

For

instance in the former USSR and the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe and
Asia,. steps have been taken to transform their centrally planned economies into
market economies. Globalisation of manufacturing and national and international
competition have been major motors for these changes. Market forces are
increasingly being allowed

to drive the entire national economy, which often

involves institutional changes, away from public enterprise in centralised economies.

It is in this environment that port institutional reform is taking place. In many
developed countries and most developing countries, ports are, in one form or another,
public-sector entities. Some countries consider ports as a service sector for the
general national economy. Some people think that Ports are so vital and strategic to
countries that they should come under direct public control. Some countries see no
other alternative than public-sector involvement since large investments are required
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for port development. The public nature of the port sector, together with the serious
problems in some countries, makes the port sector a target for institutional reform.

Considering the important place of ports in the national economy, they should
contribute in minimising costs between the production site and the consumers. For
doing this the ports should have the ability to adjust to ship size, to reduce the ships’
turnaround time , to offer handling equipment for the different type of ships existing
and cargo , and carry out the handling operations in a way to optimising the use of
their facilities and reduce costs for the ships being served.

4.1.1.2-Reasons for changes

All over the world , basic port activities can seem identical, namely loading
and discharging, receiving and delivering cargo, storage, services for ships etc.
However, when comparing the performance of various ports, differences are seen
between ports, even within the same region. For example, in Western European
ports, the average productivity for container handling in 1998 ranged from 14 to 30
moves per hour per crane. In an Asian port in 1992, 458 containers were handled in
3.1/4 hours (Port view, Port of Singapore Authority review, January 1998) and the
vessel stayed at berth for less than half a day, while in another port in the region, the
same number of containers required a vessel to spend two to three days in the port.
The difference in labour productivity between ports cans also be considerable. In
major port in the Far East in 1997, 7,200 employees were needed to handle about 200
million tons of cargo, while in another port of a developing country in the same
region, 52,000 employees were needed to handle about 150 million tons of cargo.
Low productivity and inefficiency have made some ports very expensive for their
clients. This is the case of the Port of Port-au-Prince.
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Many developing countries want to expand their exports in order to generate
foreign currencies and develop their economies. Trade promotion has then been
adopted as a national economy policy. Poor port performance can no longer be
tolerated and governments have realised that the poor services and high costs of their
ports are hampering their trade development and national economy. The proportion
of port charges in the final delivered cost of traded products varies from 0.2 per cent
for cargo of high value to more than 20 per cent for that of low value. As exports of
developing countries are often of low unit value, port performance is more important
for them than for developed countries. Although more developing countries are
entering the world market with manufactured goods, they have often been providing
low value-added products and products that compete on price rather than quality.

4.2- Objectives of port reform

Restructuring is the dominant issue in the port industry today. The driving
force of this phenomenon can vary from country to country but the main objective is
to make the port in tune with the market requirements and to review its position
regarding its global environment . Effectively, this environment is rapidly changing
and permanently bringing up more complicated market situations, new technology,
frequent shifts of customer preferences, more intensive capital investment to keep
pace with the competitors (Ircha, 1999). Therefore, port restructuring is not an
isolated process which is done for the sake of change. It should be the reflect of the
circumstances surrounding the port itself and the port objectives and options with
respect to this changing and dynamic environment.

Restructuring requires then a thorough analysis of the local, regional and
international market environment in which the port operates and obviously the
particular problems that the port is facing internally and externally regarding the
structural, financial and operational patterns. The choice of suitable restructuring
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method and strategy depends largely upon the result of such analysis in order to avoid
as much as possible any regrettable error in the decision making process.

The general objective of port restructuring is to make port management
market oriented and thus enable to satisfy its clients’ needs, subject to meeting its
financial objectives, (UNCTAD, 1995). This objective may seem to be abstract, but it
is important for the success of any port reform. The notion of the market is extremely
important in the analysis as well as in the restructuring process. All over the world
there are both successful an unsuccessful ports with various kinds of structure and
management style: the port can be big or small, landlord or operating, public or
private. However, successful ports have one thing in common, they all are highly
market-oriented, while unsuccessful ports are not.

Efficiency is a too narrow concept to be considered as a general objective of
port restructuring. A port can provide efficient services that clients do not need, and
not provide those they do need. While cost-effectiveness is a measure of efficiency,
there are other services that the market requires. Awareness of actual and potential
market possibilities and requirements, flexibility, responsiveness, reliability,
friendliness to mention only a few, are nowadays important requirements of the
market, but are not necessarily reflected in the concept of efficiency.

Other more specific objectives are indispensable for developing a strategy and
implementing a project. However, none should substitute, override or undermine the
basic objective of responsiveness to the market. For privatisation, in many cases, to
secure financing is an objective of port institutional reform. The government and the
port authority lack the financial resources for new port projects and try to attract
private capital. However, if this is the general objective, their attempt will probably
fail. If the port sector is not financially viable under the public sector, the private
sector is unlikely to invest. To involve the private sector , other market-oriented
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changes need to be implemented. If the state-owned ports are not profitable, tit may
not be possible to privatise them unless and until action has been taken to remove the
causes of their losses and then to make them profitable. Thus, it may be necessary
first to deregulate and commercialise ports, regardless of whether they are
subsequently privatised. If ports are profitable over long term, it is not because they
have been privatised, but because they have satisfied the market. In other words,
ports cannot make money for their development often because they have failed to
adapt their organisation and management to the market’s requirements.

The specific objectives of port restructuring vary greatly. The most important
is to enhance the efficiency of port services. Some ports called for institutional
reform, such as deregulation or privatisation, or diversify services or reduce costs.
Financial sustainability has been a specific objective for many ports, either to
alleviate the government’s financial burden for the ports that are losing money, or to
obtain new financial sources for development projects that the governments find
difficult to finance. The following are some specific objectives for port institutional
reform.

-to enhance the efficiency of port services;
-to diversify port services and promote competition;
-to reduce the costs of port services;
-to promote the port in the market;
-to facilitate organisational streamlining;
-to acquire management expertise;
-to find new financial resources for development;
-to strengthen entrepreneurial and managerial capacity;
-to ease the introduction of modern management methods;
-to solve/improve labour problems;
-to relieve the government’s financial and administrative burden;
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-to eliminate/minimise bureaucratic/political influence;

All these specific objectives are directly linked with the general objective to
enable the port to satisfy the needs of the market and the clients, and they are all
economic objectives. In addition, there are some other objectives set by the
government’s political policy. Some countries in transition from former centrally
planned economies to market economies, for instance, have adopted a policy of
developing the sector as the engine of growth and have made privatisation the end
objective. Other countries focus on the internationalisation of public firms even if
they are already market-oriented. In ports, there are particular objectives for
privatisation programmes. For instance, the Government of Singapore announced in
1992 that the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) was to be privatised. (The Journal of
Commerce, 1992, page 23). Although the PSA is a public entity, the decision was not
based on improving market orientation or efficiency of port management, as PSA has
been client oriented port and is one of the most efficient ports in the world. The
government’s objective was to promote the growth of the country’s capital market
and to broaden and democratise the ownership of the port along with other large
national enterprises.

The present situation of the IPPAP shows many problems related to the
management and the port operations systems. We think that the IPPAP needs to be
run differently. Experience has demonstrated in others countries that changed from
a port runs by public sector to private that means privatise it has most of the time
been successful.

There are many reasons for privatisation of state owned companies.

It

depends mainly of the situations of those companies and priorities of the
governments. In first place usually the fact that governments want to promote
economic or financial efficiency. For developing countries there is another major
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objective, which is to modernising and internationalising the economy. Such
achievement implies changing the roles of the state and the private sector (Gamba,
Ana ,1994).

Behind these general objectives , there are more specific targets which can be
as followed. Some countries will be given as examples:

a)- Desire to raise cash flow by selling state assets. In Brazil for example this
is the main reason given by the Brazilian authorities for privatisation.

b)- Reduction of external debt is another reason for privatisation. This is the
primary reason in several African countries where often large amounts of subsidies
have to be paid to public enterprises which loose a lot of money.

c)- The participation of the private sector in a more active way in the
economy is also an incentive for privatising public enterprises. It is recognised that
the private sector is more dynamic than the public one.

d)-There are many approaches which under the right circumstances can be
successful in privatising a port. The activity commonly labelled “privatisation”
actually encompasses a broad range of options, each with varying levels of public and
private sector participation and control.

4.3- Various methods of reform and their interrelation

There are now numerous approaches, which will under the right
circumstances be successful in privatising. The approach chosen would reflect the
policy and legal setting and the unique characteristics of the particular opportunity on
offer.
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4.3.1- Management modernisation

Some managerial improvements measures have to be taken in ports embarked
in institutional reforms. By this modern management techniques would be introduced
which have two advantages. First even if there is no institutional restructuring
creating social changes, managerial measures can still have positive results on port
performance. For example, in the port of Casablanca, operations were streamlined by
setting clear objectives for each department and working team, and a new statistical
system provided port managers with the means to have more efficient control. The
second advantage is that these techniques form a basis for further institutional
reforms. It is difficult to improve port services using institutional methods when
basic management systems have not been adequately developed and modernised.

Experience has shown that most modern management methods used in other
sectors, such as the manufacturing sector, are applicable in ports as well. For
example, management by objectives, cost control, quality control and rationalised
organisational structure, has proved to be an effective means to improve port
management. In the UNCTAD study where the Principles of modern port
management and organisation where discussed, one principle is to take decisions at
the level where problems arise. This often implies the need for decentralisation,
which is particularly important in the analyses of institutional reforms.

The difficulties connected with the quality of port decision-making are often
due to the great distance between the place where the problem arises and the place
the problem is solved. When the general objective is to satisfy port clients, the reason
for decentralisation is evident. I those who are in direct contact with clients cannot
take decisions, that principle will not be realised. Administrators from centralized
public port systems rarely take decisions without the consent of officials at the
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ministerial level, and they often have a relaxed attitude regarding commercial
matters. In UNCTAD’s case studies of four ports in Africa, it was found that the
good intentions to improve port performance, in most cases experienced
implementation problems were overladen with subsequent controls. The impacts of
these controls has varied from minor management inconveniences to serious delays
in decision-making. An unwillingness in the middle ranks of central government to
delegate authority to the port organisation has been one of the major reasons for the
problem, and in order to overcome it , a strong commitment at a higher level in
government is required.

One method of implementing managerial improvements is performance
agreements. These are agreements between the government and the port authority
where performance expectations, functions, responsibilities and rewards of all parties
concerned are specified. Obviously, performance expectations are related to market
needs. Responsibility is transferred to the port and their results measured to
determine the rewards.

4.3.2-Deregulation

It is essential to establish a mechanism of effective control that not only
provides freedom for managers, but also creates incentives and motivation in order to
avoid deregulation. There are a number of ways to achieve this depending on the
nature of the organisation. For an economic and commercial organisation, such as a
port, whose general objective is to satisfy market needs, the most effective way is to
use market forces. Ports are operating more and more in a competitive market where
decisions taken by owners and managers lead to full and often quick market
reactions. The principle of market discipline is that managers who take good
decisions are rewarded by more business and profits while those who do not take any
decisions or take bad decisions, are punished by financial losses and even
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bankruptcy. This market-related incentive is a strong enough to make a port efficient.
However, this market discipline functions only when there is competition.

Deregulation is a method that restores competition to a market that is
distorted by excessive regulations. Deregulation does not mean total elimination of
government regulations, but only those related to competition. Deregulation may
relate to inter-port competition for cargo, port charges, port labour and investment in
ports and port facilities. For example, in the United Kingdom, under the regulatory
framework of the 1964 Harbours Act, only limited port investments could be made
without the Government’s permission, until the restrictions were eliminated in 1985.
It is beneficial to a country to remove the regulations that restrict, limit and prohibit
competition by controlling entry, exit, prices, etc., and often lead to non-commercial
operations. However, regulations should be reinforced where a natural monopoly
exists which is difficult to break.

As a national port policy aims at long-term benefits for the country as a
whole, the government should encourage inter-port competition at national or
international levels. In any case, before taking a decision to restrict inter-port
competition for economies of scale, research and comparative studies should be done
to measure the overall and long-term gains and losses for the country’s economy
when there is competition, as compared to the results when there are restrictions.

Deregulation is only an act of removal and does not imply modification, and
even less, creation. Deregulation is also considered as a process of liberalisation of
the management of enterprises and of the whole economic system from bureaucratic
regulations. This generally brings satisfactory results, as long as the market
mechanism worked and the general interests of the society are not at stake.
Nevertheless, safeguards may be needed to prevent ports or port operators from
misusing their monopoly position in relation to port charges. For example, in the

50

United Kingdom during the deregulation phase of the 1980s, the right to appeal
certain port charges was widened. But it is unwise to use another’s experience
without assessing the characteristics of one’s own environment.

4.3.3-Commercialisation

Ports may not meet market requirements because market-oriented economic
objectives are not their principal goals. In some countries, ports are expected to
pursue micro-economic market objectives, but in others macro-economic objectives
are more important. Thus the port’s contribution to the economy or employment may
be more important than financial viability. Some countries subsidise infrastructure
while operations are carried out on a commercial basis. Therefore, requiring ports to
follow economic objectives and adapting the port organisation and management to be
in line with commercial requirements and market needs is a way to solve the
problem. This process is called commercialisation and has led to valuable
experiences for some countries’ port sectors.

Commercialisation has been a satisfactory alternative in a number of
developing countries as well. In 1984, Morocco implemented a port policy which
consisted, on the one hand, of entrusting the port authorities with tasks that fell
within the administrative sphere; and, on the other hand, of establishing a public
sector agency, Office d’Exploitation des Ports (ODEP) to carry out tasks in the
commercial sphere. ODEP, set up in 1985, is, in fact a public enterprise functioning
on an “industrial and commercial basis”. Management authority was decentralised
from the ministry, market-oriented objectives were established and effective control
mechanisms were created. After the port commercialisation reform, significant
improvements occurred in Moroccan ports. Since 1989, cargo handling has increased
by 50 per cent in all sectors. In Casablanca, the country’s major port, productivity
improved 150 per cent in 1993. Vessel waiting time has been reduced to almost zero
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in all ports. The image of Moroccan ports among their clients has now completely
changed. Due to their achievements, the Moroccan Government also transferred the
operation of several fishing ports to ODEP in 1991.

Port commercialisation works because it allows the port to fix its objective on
market needs and client satisfaction. The most difficult part of it is not introducing
changes successfully, but maintaining motivation and dynamism (UNCTAD, page
25). In commercialising port “private-type” management tool is applied that means
implementing a series of modern port-management tools, such as cost control,
financial audits, rigorous personnel policy and performance monitoring.

Sometime it is difficult to commercialise ports when the public sector is in
charge of operation and management. Some ports were unable to implement the
commercialisation programme and in other ports, the benefits of commercialisation
did not last. The reasons are complex. Some people think that a port can eliminate its
bureaucracy and become totally market-oriented by involving the private sector in its
management. One reason that the public sector often fails to serve the market well is
the fact that it is not faced with bankruptcy because it has government support and so
is less sensitive to market penalties. Consequently, the commercial discipline and
market force work best with managers whose success is determined exclusively by
their performance. Almost all port managers in the private sector are in such a
position, but only few in the public sector. this is the main reason that the private
sector is more likely than the public sector to be efficient and why an increasing
number of governments are turning to the private sector.

4.3.4- Privatisation
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The approaches previously analysed as ways that the public ports can be run
seek to make the ports more responsive to the market without changing the public
nature of the port management with managers and employees working for public
companies. Privatisation means gradually transferring the management, development
or ownership of basic port functions or assets to the private sector. Privatisation
involves private companies and private capital. It redefines the port authority’s role
by disengaging the public sector from activities which are best done by the private
sector. Port privatisation is foremost a political decision, although it has to be carried
out as an economic exercise. It depends on government policy rather than on the
wishes of port managers.

Privatisation is a broad concept that embraces a large variety of practices
from a simple lease contract to a private company to complete sell-off of port assets
and capital to the private sector. Privatisation can also be undertaken through
management contracts with an individual or a private or semi-public organisation. An
investigation by the UNCTAD secretariat in 1993e found that there were at least 31
countries in the process of port privatisation in one form or another. As regard the
degree of private participation, port privatisation can be divided into two categories :
privatisation with the public sector playing a continuing role;

and privatisation

without public involvement.

4.4- Conclusion
Conditions for reform measures: the case of the of the Port of Port-auPrince

Different implementation measures have different levels of difficulty. In fact,
not all ports prefer the easiest way to embark on their port reforms. Some ports start
with commercialisation, while others, realising that radical changes are needed, may
start with privatisation. However the choice of measures is limited (Zietlow,G.

53

Deregulation and Privatisation in the Transport Sector March 1995). Specific
conditions are required for each measure to be implemented effectively. While there
are countries where port reform has been very successful, there are also less
successful examples Most failures occur because conditions were not right when the
changes were introduced.

At the IPPAP we think that the conditions are right now for reforms to be
introduced. In fact whatever the port reform approach chosen to be implemented, no
special political or social conditions are required its achievement.

Concerning the managerial approach at the IPPAP, education and training are
important factors to achieve . Also a strong management team and good internal
communication for consensus building are essential. steps must be introduced to
identify tasks with the staff, to give them more autonomy and authority and make
them accountable for their activities.

Considering the commercialisation approach The Port Authority organisation
should be decentralised with the IPPAP under the day to day control of port managers
who had a large degree of autonomy but who would be responsible for the port’s
financial performance. Commercialisation is normally less difficult in countries
where the private sector play an important role in the national economy. and where
an appropriate legal frame work is already in place to govern enterprises. In the case
of Haiti These conditions are in the process to be in place soon. As
commercialisation needs also a competitive environment we think that the proximity
of Cuba and Jamaica where the port’s sector is dynamic, could provide this
competitive environment.

In the case of privatisation a strong government commitment is an
indispensable condition ((UNCTAD, 1995, page 30). As privatisation needs to have a
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broad-based consensus among the parties that means bureaucrats, managers, workers
and the public at large again we think that the country is ready also for this type of
port reform.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and recommendations

It has been increasingly agreed that a particular form of organisation should
be developed to suit a particular situation in a given environment rather than a
deliberate choice and preference dictated by external players. To corroborate such a
standpoint, Nagorski warns in the following terms: “it would be risky to formulate a
rigid set of rules and recommendations which would apply with equal validity to
various ports, irrespective of existing practices and specific circumstances”
(Nagorski, 1972, p180).

Likewise, the opinions of Professor Shuo Ma are in perfect agreement with
the position of Nagorski. The former thinks that all attempts at copy a model of one
port to another have proved to be a failure.

The author feels that the selection will consist of a combination of
alternatives which seems to satisfy the requirements of this particular case. The socalled mix approach will benefit the port greatly as it will try to combine the best
available options suited to its conditions.
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Although a single strategy could be used in implementing the reform of the
port, it is advisable to think of and adopt a mix that takes into consideration all port
characteristics and conditions in view of matching them smoothly. This position is
strengthened by the following statement made in UNCTAD document titled
Comparative Analysis of Deregulation, Commercialisation and Privatisation:
“suitable measures will depend on the circumstances and conditions of the port and
no measures can be implemented easily” (UNCTAD, 1995, p16).

Owing to the fact that on one hand neither the Port Authority nor the State
can afford the cost of modernising itself, and on the other hand privatisation will take
long to integrate the socio-political conditions prevailing in Haiti, it would be
sensible to advocate a meaningful commercialisation combined with a gradual level
of participation of the private sector in the commercial aspects (Charles,1998).

As it can be easily understood, the mix option will confer the advantages
inherent to commercialisation aspects and prepare the way for smooth transition
while allowing the port to benefit sooner from injection of private capital. This
option, if properly applied, will offer the port a wide range of advantages stemming
from a private-like management, thereby achieving high efficiency of operations and
better quality of services.
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